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Abstract: Objections to the use of historical case studies for philosophical ends fall into two 
categories. Methodological objections claim that historical accounts and their uses by 
philosophers are subject to various biases. We argue that these challenges are not special; they 
also apply to other epistemic practices. Metaphysical objections, on the other hand, claim that 
historical case studies are intrinsically unsuited to serve as evidence for philosophical claims, 
even when carefully constructed and used, and so constitute a distinct class of challenge. We 
show that attention to what makes for a canonical case can address these problems. A case study 
is canonical with respect to a particular philosophical aim when the features relevant to that 
aim provide a reasonably complete causal account of the results of the historical process under 
investigation. We show how to establish canonicity by evaluating relevant contingencies using 
two prominent examples from the history of science: Eddington’s confirmation of Einstein’s 
theory of general relativity using his data from the 1919 eclipse and Watson and Crick’s 
determination of the structure of DNA. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
A century ago, Arthur Stanley Eddington made his renowned eclipse observations. According 
to the best-known version of the story, his measurements of starlight bending in response to 
the sun’s gravitational field validated predictions of Albert Einstein’s general theory of 
relativity, rocketing both men to fame and cementing relativity’s superiority over Newtonian 
mechanics (see Missner 1985). This would appear to be a clear case from which to draw more 
general conclusions about the scientific process. It seems to exhibit many salient features 
beloved by philosophers: two theories that make different theoretical predictions; an 
experiment carefully designed to test those predictions; and a result favoring one theory over 
another. 
But a shadow of doubt has darkened Eddington’s analysis. In 1980, John Earman and 
Clark Glymour published a reanalysis of Eddington’s published results. Eddington and his 
collaborator Frank Watson Dyson, they concluded, had fudged the data: “the eclipse 
expeditions confirmed the theory only if part of the observations were thrown out and the 
discrepancies in the remainder ignored; Dyson and Eddington, who presented the results to 
the scientific world, threw out a good part of the data and ignored the discrepancies” (Earman 
and Glymour 1980, 85). The reasons, others have speculated, were political and ideological: 
Eddington, already convinced that general relativity was correct, wanted to see scientific ties to 
Germany restored after the damage of the Great War. Promoting the theory of a German 
scientist and fellow pacifist advanced that end. Perhaps these considerations, conscious or not, 
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compelled him to put his finger on the scales (Collins and Pinch 1993, ch. 2; Waller 2002, ch. 
3). 
Such a case might worry philosophers seeking historical support for their theories. If 
historical reinterpretation can render such an ostensibly clear case irrelevant for philosophical 
questions, then are all historical cases similarly vulnerable? Here, we address the challenge 
posed by this and other critiques of the uses of historical case studies in philosophy of science. 
Although previous commentators have outlined various reasons philosophers might regard 
historical case studies skeptically, their objections have rarely been systematized.1 We identify 
and characterize the objections that have been leveled against the use of case studies as 
evidence for philosophical claims. Systematizing these objections reveals that most of them 
amount to admonitions to exercise methodological caution—the same sort of caution that 
scientists should observe when interpreting data or that philosophers should employ when 
constructing thought experiments. In section 2, we describe and respond to these challenges, 
treating them not as rigid constraints, but as components of a roadmap for applying 
historiographical sense in service of better philosophical reasoning. 
However, one family of challenges to using historical case studies in support of 
philosophical conclusions, which we confront in section 3, has to do with the nature of history 
itself: for one, history is contingent in the sense that things could have gone otherwise, and, on 
the face of it, this raises doubts about whether we can draw philosophical conclusions from 
case studies. Building on Hasok Chang’s (2012) analogy between the historical process of 
science and the narrative sweep of a television program, we show how attention to contingency 
in the historical process can establish the canonicity of certain cases, relative to particular 
philosophical aims. Canonical cases, we argue, can serve as evidence for philosophical claims. 
Before embarking on this project, we must delineate the scope of our analysis. 
Philosophy of science addresses a range of questions, which can be divided roughly into 
metaphysical and epistemological questions. Metaphysical questions are concerned with what 
the world is like: what kinds of entities and processes does it contain, and what are their 
characteristic features? We do not ask about the nature of time or causation from the armchair; 
instead, we consult our best physical theories, supplementing the answers these theories 
provide with interpretations and argumentation that are beyond their remit. Metaphysical 
questions address the nature of reality; science informs these answers insofar as it furnishes 
evidence for this.2 It thus seems that, in order to answer metaphysical questions, we should 
consult our best current science. 
Epistemological questions, on the other hand, aim to illuminate the nature of scientific 
knowledge: What is it? How is it acquired? These questions concern things like the nature of 
                                               
1 One exception is Rafael Scholl and Tim Räz (2016), who distinguish between foundational 
and methodological critiques as a preamble to their more thorough taxonomy of case studies. 
We follow a similar approach, with the aim of developing a more fine-grained typology of the 
critiques themselves. 
2 Here, we take an implicit stance on debates in the metaphysics of science (see Ladyman et al. 
2007; Slater and Yudell 2017) in order to constrain the scope of our analysis. This stance, 
however, does not bear on the argument presented in the rest of the paper. 
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explanation, the consequences of theory-ladenness of observation, the rationality of theory 
change, and the relationship between theory and experiment. In contrast to metaphysical 
questions, which ask what the world is like, the subject matter of epistemological questions is 
the practice of science and the relationship between this practice and what we can know about 
natural phenomena. Since the history of science gives us information about the very practices 
whose epistemic value we aim to understand, we address how case studies can help answer this 
latter type of question.3 The overarching aim of this paper, then, is to show how historical case 
studies can best provide evidence for answers to questions in the epistemology of science. 
 
2. Problems of Method 
Existing critiques of the use of historical case studies in philosophy of science fall into the 
broad categories of problems of method and problems of metaphysics.4 We consider them in 
turn, suggesting ways that each critique can be either obviated or turned to the philosopher’s 
advantage. 
The first sort of critique argues that the use of historical case studies in support of 
philosophical conclusions is prone to bias. First, historical case studies are narratives that 
historians must construct; because narrative construction is underdetermined, historians’ values 
and philosophical commitments can influence this process. Second, philosophers tend to select 
those case studies that support their theories and ignore those that contradict them. Third, 
philosophers’ aims can influence how historical cases are interpreted. Finally, even on the 
assumption that we agree on a particular interpretation, how we apply them may differ: which 
conclusions we draw from cases will depend on prior philosophical commitments. 
 
2.1 Construction Bias: The Theory-Ladenness of Historical Accounts 
The first sort of bias arises because historical case studies are not foraged from the wild, but 
must be constructed on the basis of various types of evidence. The historian furnishes an 
account of events: what happened; who was involved; which factors were most salient? Why 
did, say, an experiment or discovery unfold the way it did, rather than some other way—who 
was responsible, what enabled them, and which social, economic, and other factors laid the 
groundwork? 
How does the historian build an account that answers these kinds of questions? 
Drawing on Hayden White’s (1973) account of historical narrative building, Katherina Kinzel 
(2015a; 2016) suggests that each stage of historical-case construction is theory-laden.5 Historical 
cases are selected from a chronicle—the entire space of past events—and molded into a story with 
a beginning, middle, and end; certain aspects of that story are emphasized; and the way in which 
events are emplotted—the precise way in which the story is told—affects the meaning of the 
                                               
3 Schindler (2018, 188) makes a similar point. 
4 Discussions about the role of history of science in the philosophy of science date to Kuhn 
(1962). For summaries of the history of these discussions, see Nickles (1995), Schickore (2011), 
and Kinzel (2015a). 
5 This aligns with Lakatos’s view that “history without some theoretical ‘bias’ is impossible” 
(1978, 107). 
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information the case contains. For instance, Kinzel (2015a) argues that Steven Shapin’s (1975) 
sociological approach to history disposes him to emphasize the relationship between science 
and society, historical actors’ social classes, and social transformations in his account of 
phrenology in nineteenth-century Edinburgh. Moreover, emplotment requires making 
numerous decisions, each of which is theory-laden. How thickly or thinly should events be 
sliced? How much and what kinds of evidence must be included in the plot for it to be 
considered satisfactory? What do key terms mean? 
Kinzel argues that although case studies can serve a limited evidential function, they 
cannot adjudicate between competing philosophical theories. It is always possible to construct 
alternative narratives for a given historical episode, and it is often impossible to choose between 
them in a theory-neutral way. For instance, Geoffrey Cantor (1975) criticizes Shapin’s account 
of the Edinburgh phrenology debates on the grounds that Shapin fails to explain how the social 
forces he emphasizes shape scientists’ beliefs. Kinzel argues that this criticism reflects a 
difference in methodological standards, and that any choice between standards is theory-laden. 
For Shapin, stating the sociological facts is sufficient to account for differences between 
scientists’ theoretical approaches; Cantor insists that for these factors to be explanatory, we 
would also need to know how they influence individual beliefs and attitudes. According to 
Kinzel, the fact that criteria for choosing among alternative historical narratives are theory-
laden implies that these narratives cannot arbitrate neutrally between competing philosophical 
theories. 
 
2.2 Selection Bias 
Even given an array of theory-neutral narratives to choose from—the possibility of which the 
above objection denies—we would still encounter another problem. Philosophers, addressing 
philosophical questions, naturally proceed with philosophical agendas. And the history of 
science offers a cornucopia of examples; historical grist exists for almost any philosophical mill. 
The utility of case studies might then be undermined by philosophers’ psychological 
predisposition to cherry-pick those cases that support their preexisting views (Pitt 2001). 
This critique has a long history. Thomas Nickles points to a legacy dating to the 1960s 
of historians criticizing philosophers for “yank[ing] specially selected cases out of time and 
historical context to support a favorite thesis” (1995, 141). More recently, Jutta Schickore 
worries that “philosophers sifting through historians’ works trying to find suitable data would 
… do so with an eye to the conceptual framework they sought to support” (2011, 467). This is a 
concern about how philosophers tend to behave when they wade into historical waters. Rather 
than being led by the content of historical examples, they tend to select case studies that match 
their philosophical presumptions. If this critique is right, then we should be skeptical of any 
historical evidence presented in favor of philosophical claims: equally potent examples might 
negate them. 
 
2.3 Interpretation Bias: The Priority of Philosophical Commitments 
The influence of philosophers’ agendas, according to Anjan Chakravartty (2017, ch. 1), runs 
even deeper: not only might our theoretical commitments bias the construction and selection 
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of case studies; they can also affect how case studies are interpreted. After the pessimistic meta-
induction undermined scientific realism, realist philosophers sought to salvage some of its 
parts. Although realism about our theories tout court was no longer a tenable position, we might 
nonetheless still be selective realists, that is, believe that some aspects of our best theories are 
(approximately) true. Chakravartty argues that case studies cannot adjudicate between various 
selective realisms and their critics because how we use case studies depends on prior 
philosophical commitments, in the sense that we are inclined to interpret them so as to 
support our positions. This is a similar claim to construction bias, except that here, it applies to 
philosophers’ interpretations of these narratives—which may well bear significant resemblances 
to the process of narrative construction that Kinzel (2015a) outlines. 
Stathis Psillos (1994), for example, argues that even though scientists in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries accounted for thermal phenomena by reference to 
the absorption or emission of caloric, they were only modestly committed to its existence. 
Moreover, the empirical success of caloric theory did not depend on caloric’s existence: 
thermodynamics, which replaced caloric theory, retained the mechanisms involved in 
explaining thermal phenomena in caloric theory. Thus, Psillos contends, we can believe those 
parts of theories that are necessary for explaining their empirical successes; since caloric was not 
necessary for explaining these successes, belief in caloric’s existence was not justified, and 
realism survives the critique.  
However, Chang (2003) and Kyle Stanford (2003) argue that Psillos’s interpretation of 
the history of caloric theory is subservient to his realism. An alternate interpretation of this 
history reveals that scientists were committed to the existence of caloric, and that this 
commitment was central to the empirical success of caloric theory. In fact, these authors argue, 
the examples Psillos cites as evidence of scientists’ lack of commitment to the existence of 
caloric ignore the influence of contemporary rhetorical norms. Such norms required modesty 
about metaphysical commitments. Given these norms, we cannot conclude that these scientists 
were not committed to the existence of caloric.  
For Chakravartty, this is a case where our philosophical ends might affect how we 
interpret historical case studies. Even assuming that historians share historiographical 
standards that guide interpretations, disagreements are sure to arise. Given how prior 
philosophical commitments sway our interpretations, it is unclear how we can adjudicate 
between competing interpretations in anything like a theory-neutral way.  
 
2.4 Application Bias: The Necessity of Prior Philosophical Commitments 
Chakravartty (2017, ch. 1) also suggests that we cannot avoid prior philosophical commitments 
even if we agree on how to interpret a case study. They still color our analysis when we try to 
decide what philosophical view the case supports. Consider entity realism, the view that we 
should believe that certain unobservable entities exist because we know enough about them 
that we can putatively use them to manipulate other systems. On this view, although what we 
believe about these entities changes when theories change, warranting a skeptical or agnostic 
attitude toward how these entities are characterized, we are nevertheless justified in believing 
that they exist (Hacking 1983; Cartwright 1983).  
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Even if we agree on the facts about historical cases and how to interpret them, we might 
still disagree about what we ought to conclude on that basis. For instance, we can agree about 
when the term “electron” was coined and which conclusions scientists drew from central 
experiments, such as J. J. Thomson’s observations of cathode rays in discharge tubes or 
Millikan’s measurement of the charge-to-mass ratio of oil drops suspended between electric 
plates. However, because the properties scientists ascribed to electrons changed significantly 
over the course of the twentieth century, we might disagree about whether the early-twentieth-
century electron is the same entity as the mid- or late-twentieth-century electron: it depends on 
which theory of reference we adopt (see also Arabatzis 2006, 32–35).  
On a causal theory of reference, an entity is “baptized” with a name, after which that 
name continues to refer to that entity because of the causal chain leading back to the baptism 
(Kripke 1980; Putnam 1975). A causal theory of reference favors entity realism: even when 
properties of the electron radically change, we can maintain our belief in the electron’s 
existence. On a descriptivist theory of reference, in contrast, part of a term’s reference depends 
on how the entity it refers to is described. Thus, when our characterization of electrons changes 
to a significant degree, we are no longer warranted in our assumption that we refer to the same 
entity. Entity realism is undermined. We might still be talking about “electrons,” but this is a 
linguistic accident; “electron” refers to different entities across theory change. 
 
2.5 Responses to Problems of Method 
Case studies, it seems, are beset by methodological challenges on every side. Historians operate 
from (often tacit) philosophical presumptions when they conduct historical inquiry and so, to 
begin with, any case studies available to philosophers are freighted with philosophical baggage. 
Philosophers then select, interpret, and apply historical cases in light of preexisting agendas. 
Thus, even if we ignore the problems with how historical case studies are constructed, their 
ability to sustain any reliable inferences remains dubious. In this section, we demonstrate that 
these methodological challenges are not special ones—they reflect the potential for bias that 
threatens any epistemic practice. 
Kinzel (2015a; 2016) argues against the use of case studies to arbitrate philosophical 
disagreements on the grounds that they are theory-laden, casting theory-ladenness as an 
insurmountable problem. If criteria are theory-laden, then we cannot say which criteria for 
historical case construction are best; all cases constructed in line with prevailing 
historiographical standards stand on equal footing. However, although individual historians 
will indeed tend to favor particular methodologies, and methodologies differ between 
historians, this does not imply that there is no way to resolve the tension. Instead, we can make 
arguments for one approach and against another, and we can evaluate these arguments from a 
metahistorical perspective. For instance, we might criticize an intellectual history for not taking 
sufficient account of social forces shaping historical actors’ motivations and actions. We could 
do this both by pointing to evidence about the case itself—for instance, showing that the 
“purely intellectual” factors are insufficient to explain a particular episode (see also section 
4.3)—or by reference to more general arguments in support of the important role that social 
factors play in the history of science. The fact that we can and often do argue in this way 
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undermines Kinzel’s claim that theory-ladenness prevents the successful arbitration of 
competing historical claims. 
We can reply in similar ways to the selection bias critique and to Chakravartty’s charge 
that philosophers’ interpretations of case studies are biased by the conclusions which the case 
studies are used to support. Just because it is possible to select and interpret case studies in light 
of one’s philosophical aims doesn’t mean one must do so! One should be wary of potential 
biases, and thus approach case-study selection and interpretation scrupulously. Moreover, part 
of an academic community’s job is to point out biases that individual authors have missed, 
show that the cases they have selected are not representative, point to counterexamples, or 
argue that their interpretations are misguided. 
What about the problem of application bias? Chakravartty argues that case studies 
cannot adjudicate between different views on entity realism because these views are 
underdetermined by history; we need a theory of reference to supplement them. This puts the 
cart before the horse: although it is true that we need a theory of reference to decide whether 
the history supports entity realism, it does not follow that we should choose our theory of 
reference to favor our desired outcome. Rather, we should adopt a theory of reference on 
independent grounds, viz. by carefully considering arguments for and against it, and only then 
look to the history to see what it tells us. That is, we can use historical case studies to adjudicate 
between positions on entity realism with respect to a theory of reference. One might object that we 
can be more confident in our knowledge of the historical facts than about which theory of 
reference is correct. But if Chakravartty is right that a theory of reference has to fill the gap 
between positions on entity realism and historical cases, then it will have to enter the picture 
somewhere. Our key claim is that our theory of reference should not be selected with the aim of 
supporting our view on entity realism, but rather on independent grounds. 
For example, if we examine the history of science and see that whenever theories 
change, entities are replaced entirely, we have a strong case against entity realism. But if we see 
that theories can change while beliefs in certain entities are retained, then we have a prima 
facie case for entity realism. Whether that case is strong does, indeed, depend on our theory of 
reference. But on the assumption that we have established a theory of reference, we can use the 
case to support or deny entity realism. For instance, if we establish a causal theory of reference 
on independent grounds, then we can argue that scientists really were talking about the same 
thing across theory change when using the word “electron”; mutatis mutandis for a descriptivist 
theory. But we should not choose our theory of reference to suit our needs. Doing so would be 
akin to cherry-picking data to support a favored scientific hypothesis. 
This is not to say that disagreements about how a case ought to be constructed, selected, 
or interpreted, or about the nature of reference, are easy to settle; on the contrary. But this 
situation is not unique: the fact that some philosophical debates last centuries does not itself 
entail that these debates will never be resolved. Rather, arguments for different positions in 
these debates must be carefully considered, and whatever stand we take, we should admit its 
fallibility. And a resolution might involve a nuanced approach, reflecting the complexity of the 
issues at hand. Similarly, the presence of divergent views, and the psychological difficulty of 
avoiding bias at every juncture, does not imply that we should give up. History, philosophy, and 
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indeed most academic disciplines rely on careful, critical analysis to answer difficult questions, 
even if a firm answer is not immediately forthcoming. The response to methodological 
critiques, in short, is to exercise methodological care.6 
 
3. Problems of Metaphysics 
The methodological problems described above are, at core, problems of underdetermination. 
Historical narratives are underdetermined by historical data; philosophical positions are 
underdetermined by historical cases. But what if history itself is just inherently unsuited to 
providing evidential support for philosophical claims? This concern runs deeper than worries 
focusing on how we construct and argue from case studies. If the utility of case studies is 
curtailed by virtue of features intrinsic to history, then the situation looks much grimmer. 
These critiques fall into two different, but related categories: Heraclitianism and contingency. 
 
3.1 Heraclitianism 
Joseph Pitt suggests a reason to dismiss the case-study method that runs deeper than the 
methodological problems outlined in the previous section: the Heraclitian variability of history. 
Pitt claims that any responsible use of history requires a) appropriate contextualization, and b) 
consideration of the whole sweep of extended historical processes, rather than the isolated 
incidents that compose those processes. In the process of deploying a contextualist approach, 
however, we find that our selection of the relevant features of historical context—for example, 
which individuals and practices to track—is both hopelessly arbitrary and reveals an essential 
instability of our analytical categories, as a result of which “all of the concepts we use to discuss 
science are in constant flux” (2001, 381). Scientific concepts, experimental methods and 
standards, and even the notion of science itself shift from one historical moment to another. 
On the strongest reading of Pitt’s view, history simply has no general features, and so case 
studies cannot support philosophical claims, which tend to be at least somewhat general. 
Such a view comes with its own hefty metaphysical baggage about the nature of the 
historical process—assuming, for instance, that it varies in a stochastic way or according to 
indiscernible patterns—on the grounds of which some (e.g., Burian 2001) have challenged Pitt. 
Let us set that rejoinder aside for the moment, however, and focus on the deep differences Pitt 
observes between historical and philosophical standards of reasoning. Heraclitianism suggests 
that the sort of contextualization that is the gold standard of contemporary historical inquiry is 
incompatible with the philosophical impulse to generalize—and that history is therefore unable 
to play an evidential role for theses in the philosophy of science. 
 
                                               
6 It is beyond the scope of this paper to develop those standards of care here—a task that 
requires a long-term disciplinary commitment. However, the fact that we do not abandon other 
epistemic enterprises when they face similar challenges, but rather seek to mitigate those 
challenges, suggests that developing such mitigation strategies is the most appropriate approach 
to the methodological worries discussed in this section. 
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3.2 Contingency 
In the final line of his condemnation of case studies, Pitt writes: “We [philosophers] seek 
precision, definitional clarity, analytic sophistication. These are good—but there is more to 
understanding: depth, flexibility, and a sense of the give and take and contingency found in 
history” (2001, 381). Pitt presents contingency here as it often appears in discussions of case 
studies: as an intrinsic feature of historical processes that tends to gum up the philosophical 
works. To the extent that philosophers are interested in history, this view suggests, they attend 
to processes that are deterministic (or nearly so) with respect to rational procedures and 
principles. 
 Contingency indeed presents serious problems if we accept this view. To any 
philosopher seeking to found normative claims about science in history, the critic can respond 
that any historical episode, or set of episodes, was either chancy or depended upon factors 
tangential to the philosopher’s normative aims. The critique might be formulated as follows: 
Because history is not governed by strict, deterministic rules (at least not rules that limited 
beings such as ourselves can discern), it might in some meaningful sense have gone differently. 
Because history might have gone otherwise, we have ample reason to doubt whether historical 
examples can constitute firm evidence for philosophical claims that seek to generalize about 
scientific practice and process. 
 
3.3 Ungeneralizability: The Consequence of Heraclitianism and Contingency 
The challenge for case studies, then, is this: Because of its fundamental variability and 
contingency, history might not be the type of thing that can sustain general claims. If so, it 
cannot support philosophical conclusions, which aim at (some level of) generality. We might 
worry that history is simply so variable that it cannot support even highly localized general 
claims. We can, if we look hard enough, find many counter-instances for any possible 
generalization. And even our best instances might have unfolded otherwise. It is therefore 
doubtful that any number of historical cases can sanction universal or even relatively general 
claims about the scientific process. 
Further, generalizing from case studies requires delineating cases, a process that creates 
additional opportunities for our biases to color our judgment and hampers our confidence in 
such generalizations (Pitt 2001, 374). How do we know when we are looking at something 
distinct enough to qualify as a case? What criteria should we apply to cordon off a case from 
adjacent events? We need cases before we can form case studies from which we might 
generalize, and the difficulty of carving history into cases hampers our ability to do so. 
Schickore (2011, 469) notes that philosophers are often ambiguous about the target of 
their generalizations. It will remain unclear what a general philosophical claim is really about 
unless we agree on a well-defined scope for the philosophy of science—but such a consensus 
hardly seems forthcoming. And in its absence, it will be uncertain both what range of cases 
studies is germane to a given philosophical question and what the domain of applicability for 
any putative generalization is.  
The problem of ungeneralizability is a concern for any underdetermined reasoning 
process, even those relying on highly consistent and reliable evidence. But Heraclitianism and 
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contingency might give us reason to believe that history is the sort of thing that is particularly 
ill-suited to generalization, above and beyond the problems of theory-ladenness. In addition, 
the fuzziness of cases and the uncertain scope of philosophy of science further suggest that 
examples from history might be fundamentally unsuitable for the philosophical project. Even 
philosophers seeking modest descriptive accounts of scientific reasoning and practice will find 
history too unruly to be systematized. The stronger, normative claims about right scientific 
practice other philosophers seek on the basis of historical evidence will then, a fortiori, be 
hamstrung from the outset. 
Metaphysical critiques in their strongest form suggest that the process of history itself is 
simply inappropriate for the philosopher’s evidentiary needs. These critiques, then, are distinct 
from the methodological critiques discussed above, and so have to be addressed somewhat 
differently. 
 
4. Responses to Problems of Metaphysics: Confrontation, Contingency, and Canonicity 
Metaphysical criticisms suggest that case studies cannot bear on philosophical problems at all, 
leading some to abandon talk of case studies altogether. Schickore (2011), in her own reaction 
to metaphysical criticisms, challenges what she calls the confrontation model, in which 
philosophical claims are confronted with historical evidence. Considering this model too naïve 
an analogy between the way data informs theory in the natural sciences, Schickore suggests that 
history and philosophy are partners in a shared interpretive exercise, bringing complementary 
resources to bear on a common object of inquiry. 
We agree with Schickore’s contention that philosophy of science is an interpretive 
exercise, but stop short of discarding the analogy with the natural sciences entirely. One does 
not need to adopt the confrontation model in order to draw useful parallels between 
philosophical and scientific inquiry. As we have seen, many concerns about case studies center 
on how biases inform interpretive processes—problems that have received a great deal of 
attention from natural scientists. To the extent that reasoning from experimental scientific data 
is like reasoning from historical data, we can learn much from how natural scientists manage 
potential biases. We therefore follow Kinzel in suggesting that “historical case studies might 
provide some kind of evidence for philosophical claims even if the confrontation model is 
misguided,” and that we should not discard any babies in our haste to drain the bath water 
(2015a, 50). 
Chang proposes another way forward: “I prefer to speak of historical ‘episodes' rather 
than ‘cases’. When we have an episode of The Simpsons, or Buffy the Vampire Slayer, or what have 
you, the episode is not really a case or an example of whatever the general idea of the show 
might be. Rather, the episode is a concrete instantiation of the general concepts” (2012, 110–
11). In Chang’s picture, history and philosophy interact iteratively, such that historiographical 
puzzles can improve philosophical frameworks, which in turn clarify the significance of 
historical episodes. Below, we take up and extend Chang’s proposal. 
One limitation with the existing literature is that it focuses, with a few exceptions (e.g. 
Scholl and Räz 2016), on the broad question of using case studies, rather than on the 
particulars of what makes a good case study. This approach suggests that the conceptual validity 
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of case studies needs to be established before we decide how to deploy them. But this is not 
obviously the best way forward. Instead, we might begin by thinking about what features a case 
study would need to have in order to be suited to drawing inferences about philosophical 
claims. We undertake that task by showing how attending to the practices that establish what 
constitutes a canonical case study in philosophy of science obviates the objections we sketched 
above. 
 
4.1 Case Studies and Canonicity 
Chang’s analogy to fictional television programs is compelling, and provides a useful alternative 
to the confrontation model. But it fails to reflect some pertinent aspects of the historical story 
we have. A single television show, despite employing many writers, is typically driven by a clear 
directorial vision. Although it might have many sub- and side-plots, it largely follows a single 
narrative arc. A similar claim with respect to science would be contentious at best. As a result 
of these characteristics, each episode of a television program instantiates the show as a whole to 
a similar degree. The same is not true of historical case studies. 
 Science, therefore, does not resemble a television show so much as a more sprawling 
fictional world, the product of many (often competing) authorial visions, with diverse and 
interlocking, but not necessarily unified, sub-plots, that evolves through multiple media. Roy 
Cook (2013) calls these Massive Serialized Collaborative Fictions (MSCFs): multi-author fictional 
universes with so many component works that no individual can reasonably consume them 
all.7 An analogy between the history of science and an MSCF preserves the benefits of Chang’s 
analogy to television shows, while also capturing the essential variability of scientific practices. 
Cook’s analysis identifies a distinctive feature of MSCFs. Because of the practical 
limitations to any individual gaining a synoptic view of these fictional universes, detailed 
practices must emerge to negotiate canonicity within them. Canonicity, for Cook, is a property 
of “a privileged subfiction that constitutes the ‘real’ story regarding what is fictionally true in 
the MSCF, whereas noncanonical stories are ‘imaginary’ or are de-legitimized in some other 
sense” (2013, 272). The canonical status of particular works within an MSCF is established 
through negotiation, a process that involves both producers and consumers of the work, 
responds to political and commercial pressures as well as matters of internal consistency, and 
results in a provisional judgment that is subject to renegotiation. 
If we accept Chang’s picture of the history of science as like a fictional world insofar as 
each case instantiates general concepts, and incorporate the insight that the history of science is 
more like an MSCF than a single television program, then we should accept the inevitability 
that some cases will instantiate general concepts better than others. Some historical cases are 
canonical for particular philosophical questions, others are non-canonical. And canonicity is a 
negotiated property of a historical episode: it must be established through a give-and-take 
between historians and philosophers.  
                                               
7 Examples would include the Star Trek and Star Wars universes, the DC and Marvel comic 
book universes, the Buffyverse, and the worlds of Sherlock Holmes and many daytime soap 
operas. 
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This characterization has three consequences. First, canonicity is a provisional 
designation. As with works of fiction, the canonicity of historical cases is always open to 
renegotiation. As we discuss below, this feature nicely captures the actual practice of the history 
of science. History is a complex system that provides messy data. Using it requires tools suited 
to that data. Previous commentators have tended to view historians’ and philosophers’ 
disagreements over how to interpret case studies as evidence that a multiplicity of competing 
interpretations undermines their utility (e.g. Kinzel 2016). But if we conceptualize this as a 
process of negotiating canonicity, then we can view it instead as aiding the utility of history for 
philosophy of science by sharpening our understanding of particular cases and forcing us to 
examine and defend their canonical status. 
Second, canonicity is a local, purpose-relative property of case studies. Here, our notion 
of canonicity differs somewhat from Cook’s, which establishes canonicity with respect to a 
maximal fictional universe. It would make little sense to say that a historical case study is 
canonical for all of science; we must take seriously the provision that a case is only ever 
canonical with respect to a particular philosophical aim. Thus, case studies that we might want 
to consider non-canonical with respect to questions about good scientific practice—such as 
Lysenkoism—might still be canonical with respect to philosophical questions about the 
influence of ideology on scientific practice. When we negotiate canonicity, we must be clear 
about the domain of applicability and the level of generality of our cases. 
Third, canonicity implies a particular relationship between canonical case studies and 
the philosophical disputes upon which they bear. If we establish a case as canonical, can that 
case settle a philosophical dispute? In principle, yes; in practice, it is not so straightforward. 
Before we can deem a case study canonical, we require a thoroughgoing understanding of its 
relevant features. However, we can expect ignorance of some those features to linger, for at 
least two reasons. First, we face the methodological challenges outlined in the previous section. 
Second, both history and philosophy are complex, so the sort of complete knowledge required 
is unattainable for limited beings such as ourselves. That ignorance provides one opportunity 
for philosophical disagreement, even about cases that seem to motivate a stance on a 
philosophical problem particularly strongly. Nevertheless, if we have a case that would decide a 
philosophical question in the limit of our knowledge of its features, our improved knowledge 
of that case will more strongly motivate a particular stance. 
This point resembles Nancy Cartwright’s (1989) ideas about the relationship between 
the abstract and the concrete. An abstract concept instantiates a concrete one: something 
cannot be a game without also being football, or chess, or bridge, or some other specific game. 
Similarly, a case study cannot, in principle, be canonical for a philosophical problem without 
being an instantiation of some position or other. But the “in principle” here is key: actual cases 
deviate significantly from in-principle cases, due both to our difficulties in overcoming various 
biases and to the complexity of history and philosophy. In practice, there is room for 
disagreement even once a case is established as canonical. 
To conclude, a clarification: when we try to establish canonicity, our first concern is 
whether the example is relevant for deciding a particular case. The fact of its relevance might or 
might not motivate a particular perspective on the philosophical problem. The discussion here, 
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therefore, is concerned with the suggestion that variability and contingency entirely undermine 
the value of history for philosophy of science. We might agree that a case is canonical and 
nevertheless still have reasonable disagreements about what the case tells us; but this is a 
problem of method and subject to the considerations discussed above. 
 
4.2 Contingency Makes the Canon 
We contend that, far from bedeviling philosophers’ attempts to use historical cases, 
contingency can make history matter for philosophy. To see how, we must first distinguish 
between three senses of contingency. John Beatty (2006) makes the most critical distinction 
between types of contingency. The first is unpredictability contingency (or “contingency per 
se”), which presumes fundamental randomness or indeterminacy in the historical process. We 
can understand Pitt’s Heraclitianism as implying a claim of this sort: history is unsuited for 
supporting philosophical claims because it could have been otherwise, even given identical 
starting parameters. The second is causal-dependence contingency (or “contingency upon”), 
which does not presume indeterminacy, but rather identifies the antecedent factors upon 
which historical outcomes crucially depend. To these, we can add explanatory-insufficiency 
contingency (Martin 2013). This can be understood as a weaker version of unpredictability 
contingency. A claim of this type takes the form: “X is contingent with respect to a particular 
set of explanatory factors.” That is, the underlying processes might or might not be fully 
determined, but if we only consider certain antecedent factors, then it will look to us as though 
the process is indeterminate.8  
 Critiques of the use of historical case studies in support of philosophical claims tend to 
invoke either unpredictability contingency or explanatory-insufficiency contingency. The 
former kind of critique is implausible because it comes with deep metaphysical commitments 
about the historical process—commitments that are suspect. When we look at physical 
processes, we find some of them to be highly stable with respect to external perturbations. 
Think of the semiconducting circuits in your computer that are designed to perform identically 
across a wide range of temperatures. Others, like weather systems, are more chaotic. Small 
changes in initial conditions, like temperature, can lead to vastly different outcomes. Chemical 
and biological systems also run the gamut from highly robust to highly chaotic, depending on 
the type of system and the factors against which we assess their stability. (Your computer’s 
circuits are robust with respect to temperature changes, for example, but less robust with 
respect to the action of a sledgehammer. Vice versa for the weather.) 
We cannot experiment with historical systems, and so we cannot say with certainty 
whether they are robust or chaotic, but the most responsible assumption is that they lie across a 
similarly broad spectrum. Our understanding of processes that make up history gives us good 
reason to believe that some historical processes are robust, and others chaotic (Ben-Menahem 
1997). Historical processes are constituted by physical, biological, psychological, and other 
processes that we know to have variable robustness. In short, we should be suspicious of any 
                                               
8 The contingency concept has been decomposed further (Martin 2013; Kinzel 2015b), but for 
our purposes it will suffice to focus on these three general senses in which it is employed.  
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account of history that suggests that it is either always inherently stable or always inherently 
chaotic. One of the tasks of historical inquiry, then, is to offer arguments for why we should 
regard a particular system as either robust or chaotic, to what extent, and with respect to what. 
Next, let us consider explanatory-insufficiency contingency, the other principal way in 
which contingency functions in critiques of historical case studies. Such critiques do not insist 
that a particular process is random or infinitely variable, but rather that the outcome of that 
process is not explicable in terms of a specific set of explanatory factors. The most familiar 
example comes from Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin (1979), who famously 
suggested that evolutionary outcomes are contingent (unpredictable) with respect to selection 
effects alone. This does not imply a commitment to the impossibility of evolutionary outcomes 
being fully determined when we introduce other factors—and, in fact, Gould and Lewontin’s 
purpose was to draw attention to certain additional factors, such as genetic drift and pleiotropy, 
as necessary components of more complete evolutionary explanations. 
Similarly, explanatory-insufficiency arguments in history suggest that a set of factors, 
typically a set that previous historians have favored, do not explain the outcome of the 
historical process and that we need to invoke other factors to develop a satisfactory account. In 
the Eddington case (which we discuss in more detail in 4.3), Earman and Glymour suggested 
that responsible data-handling practices do not provide an adequate historical explanation of 
the reported results of the eclipse expedition: their reconstruction of Eddington’s data yielded a 
different result. Thus, we need to invoke something more than the data themselves and best 
practices for interpreting them to explain why Eddington got the result he did. And subsequent 
historians argued that ideological factors were best suited to fill the explanatory gap. 
Consequently—and critically—the argument that the outcome of the eclipse expedition derived 
from ideological factors threatens to render the case moot for a whole swath of philosophical 
questions. If we are interested in the rational process of theory choice, for instance, and we 
believe that Eddington arrived at his results in an irrational way, the case will not help us 
resolve the philosophical debates in question. 
Here, we should clarify the notion of rationality that underpins this contention. We 
follow Schindler in understanding rational processes or methods, first, to be justifiable 
independently of the historical facts describing how they were deployed (2013a), and second, to 
be those that are best suited to promoting truth or empirical adequacy (2018, 192–93). 
Schindler acknowledges that these are utopian goals, but argues that such a conception of 
rationality nevertheless enables us to judge when an agent is irrational, for instance, if she 
adopts a theory that contradicts all available evidence. This notion of rationality does not 
exclude social factors—indeed, rational decisions are often made communally—but it does 
exclude decisions that are not made with the aim of truth or empirical adequacy. That is, had 
Eddington and Dyson interpreted their data solely with political aims, failing to take into 
consideration whether their interpretation accorded with the evidence, we would take this to 
be irrational.  
We pointed out above that explanatory-insufficiency contingency can be understood as 
a weaker form of unpredictability contingency. But another way to understand it is as the 
inverse of causal-dependence contingency. Whereas a causal-dependence claim singles out a 
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factor or set of factors as potent determinants of a historical outcome, an explanatory-
insufficiency claim instead highlights the causal impotence of certain factors. For example, the 
explanatory-insufficiency claim in the Eddington case is that rational factors alone were 
insufficient to explain why Eddington got the results he did. In other words, contrary to how 
historians traditionally presented the case, rational factors do not provide a causally complete 
account of Eddington’s results. The consequence, if such an argument holds, is that the case is 
immaterial for assessing scientific reasoning.  
In order to argue that the Eddington case is indeed canonical with respect to 
philosophical questions about rational processes, we would need to show that rational factors 
can provide an adequate causal account of his reported results. In other words, to establish a 
case as canonical with respect to a philosophical aim, we necessarily invoke causal-dependence 
contingency, which consists of three related, but distinguishable claims:  
(1) The causal claim—a causal connection exists between a historical outcome and a 
particular antecedent factor;  
(2) The counterfactual claim—that antecedent factor might plausibly have been different;  
(3) The sensitivity claim—the historical outcome was non-robust with respect to changes 
in that antecedent factor (see Ben-Menahem 1997).  
The plausibility of the contingency claim depends on each of these holding. The argument is 
undermined if the causal connection fails, if the relevant antecedent factor was in some sense 
inevitable, or if the outcome was robust with respect to other factors and therefore insensitive 
to changes in the relevant antecedent condition. For instance, we cycled to work this morning, 
and so perhaps we could claim that our presence at work is (causal-dependence) contingent 
upon our bikes being in working order. The bikes were causally relevant for our arrival at work 
(satisfying the causal claim) and bikes are the sorts of things that sometimes break (satisfying 
the counterfactual claim). However, if we live within walking distance of the office, or on a 
reliable transit line, then we might challenge this contingency claim, because in the event of a 
flat tire, we could simply walk or take the bus. Our arrival at work is robust with respect to the 
condition of our bikes. For the causal-dependence contingency claim to hold in this case, we 
would have to be in circumstances such that the bikes were the only reliable means of getting 
to work. 
 How, then, does attending to contingency help us establish the canonicity of a case 
study? A canonical case is one that can be explained by factors relevant to the philosophical 
question at hand—and in which the outcome is sensitive to those explanatory factors. 
Establishing a case’s canonicity, then, requires demonstrating that those explanatory factors are 
not washed out by other contingencies inherent in the process. That is, it involves making 
judgments about the relevant robustness relationships. 
That is all well and good, a skeptic might argue, but how do we do that? We can 
understand how a well-controlled experimental system responds to small perturbations in 
initial conditions by running the experiment over and over again with the necessary 
modifications. History is anything but a well-controlled experimental system! But all is not lost. 
Two examples can illustrate how good historiographical sense can ground claims about the 
robustness of historical systems. 
 16 
 
4.3 Reviving the Canonicity of Eddington’s Eclipse Expedition 
Recall again the charge that Eddington and Dyson were selective in which data they factored 
into their analysis. Had they taken it all into account, Earman and Glymour argued, the result 
they obtained for the sun’s effect on passing light rays would have been much closer to the 
classically expected value. But more recent historical work that takes a broader view of the 
relevant experimental practice has shown that the judgments Eddington and his collaborators 
made were based on a finely tuned experimental sense (Kennefick 2012; 2019). They worked 
closely with the finicky instruments they used to take the photographic plates that provided the 
eclipse data, and so they had a good idea of which data were reliable and which were 
questionable. They were not being led down the garden path by prior theoretical or political 
commitments; they were inching ahead carefully based on sound experimental sensibilities and 
intimate knowledge of their instruments. 
How can attending to the contingencies involved in the Eddington example help us 
assess its canonicity with respect to philosophical questions about theory and evidence? First, 
consider the history of the example itself. We have a historical claim, C1, that Eddington’s 
observation of light deflection during the 1919 eclipse confirmed Einstein’s general theory of 
relativity. This is a case that we might use to support a philosophical argument, for instance 
about the importance of novel prediction for theory choice (pace Brush 2015). 
We can understand further historical work as arguing that this example is in fact non-
canonical with respect to those questions. Earman and Glymour reexamined Eddington’s 
publications, tried to redo his analysis, and developed a new historical claim, C2, that 
Eddington’s data could have been interpreted—maybe even could have been better interpreted—
as supporting the classical theory. 
This claim involves two contingency arguments. First is an explanatory-insufficiency 
argument: Eddington and Dyson’s conclusion that Einstein’s theory was right was contingent 
with respect to the eclipse data and the contemporary best practices for interpreting it. We must 
instead invoke other factors to account for their conclusion. And we can do so via a causal-
dependence contingency claim. Subsequent historians advanced such a claim by suggesting that 
Eddington’s conclusion was contingent upon his politics. In the wake of World War I, he had an 
interest in supporting the work of a German scientist and fellow pacifist in order to heal the 
damage done to the European scientific community (Collins and Pinch 1993; Waller 2002). In 
other words: (1) Eddington’s politics were causally relevant to his results; (2) individual political 
commitments are not the sorts of things we consider inevitable, and so a differently inclined 
Eddington, or a scientist with different political sensibilities, might have behaved differently; 
(3) the results were sensitive to changes in the interpreter’s political commitments; other factors 
would not robustly produce the same result. 
But Daniel Kennefick’s (2019) recent work represents another historiographical shift. 
He conducts a detailed analysis of Eddington and Dyson’s reasoning process, including not 
only the photographic plate data, but also a close consideration of the instruments used to 
collect it. Interpreting data, as we all know, is not straightforward. It requires tacit knowledge 
and instrumental sense. Experience with specific instruments informs experimenters’ 
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judgments about which data is reliable and which should be discarded. C2, that is, rests on an 
assumption that Eddington and Dyson discarded data without good methodological cause. But 
that claim must be defended with respect to the experimenters’ interactions with their tools. 
Kennefick shows why, on these grounds, they had good reason to discard the data they did. 
That gives us a new claim, C3, that Eddington’s interpretation is (causal-dependence) 
contingent upon his data and his detailed knowledge of the instruments that produced them. 
On C3, the Eddington case regains its canonical status with respect to questions about theory 
and evidence. 
A case-study skeptic might suggest that philosophers lack the tools to judge these 
different interpretations, and so will be inclined to cherry-pick the one that best suits their 
preconceptions. But this would be cynical. Kennefick’s analysis suggests a prudent principle of 
charity: it makes good methodological sense to assume that scientists broadly act in accordance 
with prevailing methodological norms. The burden of proof falls on those who propose 
deviations from them. On that basis, we have strong grounds for provisionally accepting 
Kennefick’s contention that the eclipse data can count as a canonical example of responsible 
reasoning from data. 
This is not to say that Kennefick’s interpretation is the final word. It has, in fact, been 
challenged by Samuel Schindler (2013b, 96–98), who suggests that Eddington and Dyson did 
not have sound experimental reasons to selectively discard data. However, Schindler argues that 
they were nonetheless methodologically justified in looking to theory for guidance in pruning 
their dataset. This point, then, is aligned with Kennefick in seeking an explanation of scientists’ 
behavior in rational terms before reaching for contextual explanations tangential to the aims of 
the scientific enterprise.9 
We should extend a similarly charitable arm to philosophers, whom we should expect 
to rely on good historiographical principles when manipulating historical case studies. That is, 
a good philosopher ought to acquire the sensibilities that promote good judgment when using 
the tools of the trade, just as a good scientist ought to cultivate tacit knowledge that promotes 
good judgment about the data her instruments generate. Good science involves selecting data 
with care, together with a keen know-how about how this selection ought to take place. 
Similarly, good philosophy of science, when it involves the use of historical case studies, must 
select and interpret these case studies judiciously using both philosophical and 
historiographical tools. Analyzing the contingencies at play in historical cases, as the above 
example demonstrates, is one of the most valuable tools for judicious selection. 
Of course, we will never have a final, complete historical account. Prevailing historical 
judgments change, and so the interaction between history and philosophy must be iterative. 
                                               
9 This point is similar, but not identical, to Lakatos’s (1978) views on rational reconstruction, 
as explicated by Schindler (2018, 194–96). Lakatos contends that better accounts of scientific 
methodology can generate rational reconstructions that explain more historical facts in rational 
terms. The different, but related version of this claim that we defend is that it behooves us to 
see how far rational explanations can take us before we reach for other sorts of explanations. 
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But close contact between history and philosophy can ensure that this iterative process is a 
productive one—a point that comes through also in a second example. 
 
4.4 Could the Discovery of DNA Structure Have Been Otherwise? 
James Watson and Francis Crick’s discovery of the structure of DNA marked a milestone in 
biology, but was subsequently mired in controversy. As is well known, a key piece of evidence 
supporting Watson and Crick’s double-helical structure was Rosalind Franklin’s Photo 51, 
whose sharp, distinctive “X” pattern was known to be characteristic of helical structures. 
Without Franklin’s permission, her colleague Maurice Wilkins showed this photo to Watson, 
raising questions about how credit for the discovery of the DNA structure ought to be 
distributed. What role did this photo play in Watson and Crick’s postulation of their 
structure? Would they have been so sure about it had Watson not seen the photo? If not, 
would they have announced their structure when they did? Might Franklin have arrived at the 
correct structure herself first?  
These are questions about causal-dependence contingency, about how sensitive Watson 
and Crick’s discovery was to their having seen the photo. Answers to these questions have 
implications for who deserves credit for the determination of the DNA structure, as well as for 
larger issues about reasoning and inference in science. We acknowledge that discoveries do not 
happen in isolation; science is a collective enterprise, and those who are credited with 
discoveries rely on expertise, evidence, and input from other sources. To the extent that other 
contributions were essential or central to a particular discovery, they ought to receive credit. 
And one way of assessing centrality is by considering whether the discovery would still have 
been made had the contribution been absent. 
Thus, although Watson and Crick did, in fact, find and announce the structure of 
DNA first, the extent to which they should share credit for this discovery with Franklin 
depends on how central her photo was to this discovery. And that depends on how contingent 
Watson and Crick’s determination of the structure was upon Watson’s seeing the photo. If 
they would have determined the structure anyway, then Franklin deserves less credit; 
conversely, had they not been able to find it at all without her photo, then Franklin deserves 
ample credit.10 
We might even attempt a stronger claim: had Franklin been a man, she would have 
determined the structure herself, thereby receiving full credit for the discovery of the structure 
of DNA. In addition to how we answer the questions above, this stronger claim depends also 
on our evaluation of other contingencies. In general, how significant were barriers to women 
scientists’ productivity in the mid-twentieth century? That is, were Franklin a man, would the 
absence of critical barriers have enabled her to get the structure first? In particular, how 
significant was Franklin’s being a woman in Wilkins’s lab at King’s College? Had she been a 
                                               
10 It is outside our remit to defend the methodological wisdom of counterfactual reasoning 
here. For a lucid defense of their appropriateness—and, indeed, necessity—in the history of 
science, see Radick (2016). For a discussion of counterfactual reasoning in light of questions 
about contingency, see Soler (2015). 
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man, would Wilkins have reacted to her presence at King’s so negatively, and would they have 
had the toxic relationship they did, which was no doubt detrimental to their progress? Would 
he have shown Watson her photo? 
Answering questions about contingency with certainty is impossible: in order to do so, 
we would have to alter the features of interest—for instance, by creating a world in which 
Franklin is a man, holding all else fixed, and then “replaying the tape” (Gould 2000; Beatty 
2006). However, our inability to answer such questions with certainty does not imply that we 
cannot address them at all. Just as with any historical question, we must view our answers to 
questions about contingency as probabilistic and fallible; but we nevertheless have tools that 
can allow us to make educated inferences on the basis of the most plausible interpretation of 
all available evidence. 
Often, in fact, we can assess claims about historical contingency using such techniques, 
just as we can in ordinary life. We can say, for instance, that had we removed the pizza from 
the oven ten minutes sooner, it would not have burned, that had we not prepared for our 
lectures, we would not have been able to deliver them, that had our bicycles not gotten flats, we 
would have arrived at work on time. We can say these things because of our past experience 
making pizza, delivering lectures, and riding bicycles. Similarly, we can assess historical 
contingencies on the basis of what we know about particular historical actors and their 
contexts. For instance, if we find out that Wilkins had female collaborators with whom he 
worked well, and that King’s was generally a good place for female scientists in the mid-
twentieth century, then we have evidence that Franklin’s gender alone was likely not an 
overriding hinderance to her research. Similarly, if we have evidence that, although seeing 
Franklin’s photo lent further support to Watson and Crick’s structure, they had already 
submitted their paper to Nature, the significance for their discovery of Watson’s seeing the 
photo is undermined. 
Asking such questions is relevant not only to the apportioning of credit, which might 
be regarded as a historical question, but also to answering philosophical questions. For 
example, one of us (Bolinska 2018) has considered the question of which research strategy for 
determining the structure of DNA—that of building the model up from component parts 
(Watson and Crick’s) or that of deriving it from X-ray diffraction photographs (Franklin’s)—was 
most promising. The contention is that, given certain features of available evidence in the 
context of mid-twentieth century biochemistry—how well-confirmed it was and how many 
structural candidates it enabled one to rule out—Watson and Crick’s bottom-up strategy was, all 
else being equal, most likely to lead to the correct structure in the shortest period of time.11  
We can use the historical case to assess this philosophical claim if we can establish that 
it is canonical with respect to this claim. In order to show that it is canonical, we would need to 
show that the salient features of the case are robust with respect to the relevant contingencies. 
And in order to do this, we would need to ask similar sorts of questions to those we would ask 
if we wanted to determine how to appropriately allocate credit for the discovery of the DNA 
                                               
11 For a discussion of the roles of data, models, and theories in the context of the discovery of 
the DNA structure, see Schindler (2008).  
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structure. First and foremost, we would have to ask questions about contingency with respect 
to research strategies: had Watson and Crick opted for a different strategy, would they still have 
determined the DNA structure? Had Franklin adopted Watson and Crick’s strategy, might she 
have determined the structure instead?  
The answers to these questions can be informed by parallel cases: were similar strategies 
adopted in relevantly similar cases, and were they successful? Indeed, the race for the 
determination of the structure of protein a few years before the race for DNA is just such a 
case, with Linus Pauling adopting the model-building strategy (and subsequently inspiring 
Watson and Crick to do so) and competitors Sir Lawrence Bragg, John Kendrew, and Max 
Perutz working toward the structure from X-ray diffraction photographs. The results in this case 
were similar: Pauling, rather than Bragg et al., determined the structure first. 
Second, we can also ask the same questions we did when we were asking about credit 
for the discovery. If we can establish that the case was robust with respect to these other factors, 
but contingent upon research strategies, then we will have further supported the canonicity of 
the case with respect to choice of research strategy. If, for instance, by evaluating the relevant 
contingencies, we find that Franklin’s being a woman did not significantly hinder her work 
toward the structure, this makes it more likely that it was instead her reliance on an inferior 
research strategy. 
A few clarifications are in order. First, the cases above and their interpretations are 
meant only as examples of how contingency can be assessed in light of historical evidence in 
order to establish the canonicity of a historical case study with respect to a philosophical aim. 
The particular cases and their interpretations are of course contentious, and arguing that they 
should be interpreted as we suggest is beyond the scope of this paper. Second, and relatedly, 
establishing canonicity is a negotiation, and is by no means straightforward. Thus, 
disagreement about how to assess contingency claims is to be expected. Nevertheless, as we 
stressed, we should not take this disagreement to indicate that answers are not forthcoming or, 
worse, that there is no fact of matter. Making such an inference would be analogous to 
inferring from the absence of scientific consensus to the conclusion that such a consensus will 
never be reached, or that there is no fact of the matter (!) about the issue in question. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Recent work on the use of historical case studies as evidence for philosophical claims has 
resulted in several objections to this practice. This paper began by systematizing these 
objections. We found that they fall largely into two categories: methodological objections and 
metaphysical objections. The former, we argued, do not identify special challenges that do not 
also apply to other epistemic practices. Case studies demand responsible handling, but this is 
unsurprising. History is messy and philosophy is difficult. But the need for care is hardly the 
mark of a hopeless endeavor. Rather, attention to the ways in which history is messy and in 
which philosophy is difficult can be resources for developing better historiographical and 
philosophical practices. 
 Metaphysical objections do, however, raise special problems for the philosophical use of 
historical case studies. We showed that attention to what makes for a canonical case can address 
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these problems. A case study is canonical with respect to a particular philosophical aim when 
the features of the historical system relevant to that philosophical aim provide a reasonably 
complete causal account of the results of the process under investigation. We showed how to 
establish canonicity by evaluating relevant contingencies using two prominent examples from 
the history of science: Eddington’s confirmation of Einstein’s theory of general relativity using 
his data from the 1919 eclipse and Watson and Crick’s determination of the structure of 
DNA. These examples suggest that the analogy between philosophical inquiry and the natural 
sciences, although imperfect, has important elements that make it worth retaining. This is not 
to say that we should think of philosophy as modeled on scientific practice, but rather that 
both succeed by virtue of something more general: their reliance on shared principles of sound 
reasoning. 
Taking seriously the practices necessary to establish the canonicity of case studies makes 
clear that some examples of the historical process of science are more salient to particular 
philosophical aims than others. With historiographical sense, we can pick these examples out. 
Doing so requires attention to the contingencies of history. Rather than undermining the use 
of historical cases, philosophical attention to contingency aids the development of case studies 
as resources by making explicit otherwise tacit assumptions about which features of them are 
most salient and why.  
It is possible, perhaps even easy, to use irresponsibly the rich resources that history 
provides to make a predetermined point. But that is not a genuine case of history of science 
informing philosophy of science—in part because it proceeds in the absence of historiographical 
sense. By outlining the practices that render particular cases canonical for certain philosophical 
aims, we have offered a route by which such sense can be integrated into standard 
philosophical practices.  
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